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While it is too late to avert some dangerous consequences of climate change, it is not “all-or-
nothing” and our actions can still make a difference. Building on social psychology research 
showing the importance of seeing one’s group as moral, one reason people act on climate 
change is to help create a more moral and caring society. Considering climate change action 
through this lens gives rise to several challenges, including how people respond to moral 
threats, who has moral standing as advocates, the consequences of promoting a moral cause 
through “immoral” actions (e.g., breaking the law), and moral “blindspots” where some 
emitting behaviours are excluded from scrutiny. Reviewing social psychological bases for 
these issues suggests potential responses to these challenges, including the importance of 
engaging people with diverse views and backgrounds (e.g., through citizens’ assemblies), 
advisory personal carbon budgets, and broad-based policies that aim to secure the social 
wellbeing of communities as well as the protect the environment (e.g., a Green New Deal). 
Encouragingly, a recent study suggests that many people are more ready than we might 








We cannot avert dangerous climate change. It is already having damaging 
consequences, which will worsen as global temperatures increase (IPCC, 2018). Even 
keeping warming to <1.5°C seems a faint hope, requiring major commitments and action 
within the next decade (IPCC, 2018) at a time when many developed countries are falling 
short on more moderate existing commitments (https://climateactiontracker.org/countries/). 
The structural barriers sometimes seem insurmountable, with some arguing that addressing 
climate change requires fundamental reshaping of globally dominant economic and social 
systems (Klein, 2015; Monbiot, 2017). 
Yet recent high-profile public protest movements, especially in Europe (School Strike 
for Climate, Extinction Rebellion), give cause for hope that the public can pressure 
governments to enact the broader regulatory and structural changes needed to address climate 
change. While these movements place a strong emphasis on facing up to the reality of climate 
change, lessons from decades of climate change advocacy show us that not everyone is 
convinced or concerned about climate change despite the evidence (e.g., Hornsey, Harris, 
Bain, & Fielding, 2016; McCright, Dunlap, & Marquart-Pyatt, 2015), and many people are 
more concerned about other issues (Lorenzoni & Pidgeon, 2006; United Nations, 2018). This 
reinforces the need to engage people using different approaches – connecting climate change 
to their other concerns. 
One prominent approach to connect climate change to other concerns is to highlight 
the “co-benefits” of climate action for society. While the economic and health co-benefits are 
most obvious, here we focus on what might be seen as a more ephemeral co-benefit – 
creating a more moral and caring (“benevolent”) society (Bain, Hornsey, Bongiorno, & 
Jeffries, 2012; Bain, Milfont, Kashima, & et al., 2016). This co-benefit is more important 
than it might seem, but gives rise to particular challenges for addressing climate change for 




In focusing on morality co-benefits, our emphasis is on psychological factors, not the 
philosophical case for considering climate change as a moral issue. Our approach 
complements reviews focusing on other moral considerations in climate change (e.g., 
Gardiner, 2006; Markowitz & Shariff, 2012), but emphasises people’s beliefs about the 
morality of themselves and the groups they belong to – moral self- and ingroup-stereotypes – 
and their links to climate change action.   
Addressing climate change to create a more moral and caring society 
Social psychology helps explain motivations to create a more moral and caring 
society. People are particularly concerned that their groups have high moral standing (Leach 
& Brambilla, 2014; Leach, Ellemers, & Barreto, 2007). Yet many people believe that society 
is becoming less moral and caring over time (Bain, Kroonenberg, & Kashima, 2015; Kashima 
et al., 2009; Kashima et al., 2011). These people are especially concerned with addressing 
this decline, supporting actions and policies intended to restore community bonds (unless 
they believe society is incapable of changing; Kashima et al., 2009). Accordingly, the desire 
to create a more moral and caring society motivates action across diverse social and political 
issues (Bain, Hornsey, Bongiorno, Kashima, & Crimston, 2013). 
This includes climate change. The belief that addressing climate change will create a 
more moral and caring society was a consistent motivator of climate change action around the 
world, including for those unconvinced or unconcerned about climate change and for the 
political left/right (Bain et al., 2012; Bain et al., 2016). Communicating these morality co-
benefits were equally or more motivating of climate change action as conveying the reality of 
climate change (Bain et al., 2012; Bernauer & McGrath, 2016). This was particularly so for 
“environmental citizenship” – actions intended to place pressure on governments to enact 
structural and regulatory changes, such as voting, petitions, joining/donating to 




 The importance of creating a more moral and caring society is consistent with the 
societal changes some environmentalists claim are necessary to address climate change. As 
examples, Jackson (2017) and Monbiot (2017) argue that we need to redefine our notions of 
prosperity and the good life away from individual (material) gain towards contributing 
positively to our community.  
Challenges to creating a more moral society through climate change action 
Focusing on the morality co-benefits of climate action raises some challenges, and 
perhaps paradoxes, that need consideration. We first outline these challenges, then propose 
potential ways to meet them. 
Responding to a moral threat 
When people are told that socially prevalent and accepted lifestyles are harmful due to 
their environmental impact (e.g., eating meat, plane travel, car ownership), this can pose a 
threat to their sense of their group as moral. Two responses to moral threats are typical 
(Gausel, Leach, Vignoles, & Brown, 2012). One is to focus on repairing the damage ingroup 
actions have caused. The other is defensiveness to avoid or conceal the moral failure. 
Defensiveness can take many forms, but for climate change it could include undermining the 
moral credentials of “accusers” by highlighting their own moral failings and hypocrisy (e.g., 
that activists drive cars and fly), or describing them “fascistic” in trying to control people’s 
lives (Griffin, 2019, April 19). 
The decision to repair or defend is related to its perceived emotional consequences 
(Gausel et al., 2012; Gausel, Vignoles, & Leach, 2015). Gausel et al. (2012) demonstrated 
that if people believe they will be rejected due to their group’s moral failure, their feeling of 
rejection leads to defensiveness. However, people are more likely to act to repair the harm 





Advocates for a cause are expected to act in ways consistent with that cause. 
Although environmentalists act in more pro-environmental ways (Dono, Webb, & 
Richardson, 2010), a lack of viable green options for transportation, housing, and food makes 
it difficult for many people to adopt completely sustainable lifestyles. In focusing on 
morality, this implies that almost everyone in developed societies falls morally short by 
engaging in environmentally damaging activities. This raises a potential paradox – how can 
someone credibly ask others to act morally when they are falling short themselves? 
If moral purity is required for moral standing, then children can be excellent 
advocates. Relative to adults who are seen as “moral agents” (having capacities to perform 
moral actions), children are seen more as recipients of moral actions (“moral patients”) and 
thus less open to moral criticism of their own actions (H. M. Gray, Gray, & Wegner, 2007; K. 
Gray & Wegner, 2009). This may be part of the power of the school strike for climate. Yet 
we cannot leave it to children to make the case – adults also need to show moral agency.  
We should challenge the idea that being an advocate requires moral purity, because 
actually being less morally pure in the past but changing behaviour can lend credibility when 
advocating change (Attari, Krantz, & Weber, 2019). As people are more open to constructive 
criticism from ingroup members (Hornsey & Imani, 2004), those who have had high 
emissions lifestyles are more likely to be able to influence those “like them” to adopt more 
sustainable practices. But this means advocates may need to challenge their own conceptions 
of moral purity – can they overcome scepticism about commitments made by those they 
believe are most at fault? 
Engaging in “immoral” actions for a moral cause 
We use laws to enforce moral behavior, so breaking laws to promote a more moral 
society might seem oxymoronic. Protests involve actions considered immoral in everyday life 




Extinction Rebellion climate change protest in London, UK, in April 2019 resulted in 1130 
arrests and 69 charges (Metropolitan Police, 2019, April 25). In protestors’ defense, a moral 
conviction is a clear reason to confront group norms (Hornsey, Majkut, Terry, & McKimmie, 
2003), and civil disobedience can be a response to authorities who have failed to act morally 
(Tausch et al., 2011). Non-violent demonstrations of anger towards authority can actually be 
motivated by a desire for problem-solving (Weber, 2004), and their moral legitimacy is 
increased when they have high public support and positive responses from those in power (as 
happened in the UK; edie, 2019, April 24). 
However, public concern about protestors breaking the law is linked to a legitimate 
fear. If engagement with authorities does not lead to desired changes, anger can turn into 
contempt. Contempt can lead to dehumanization and moral exclusion (Becker & Tausch, 
2015), placing its targets outside the realm of moral concern and this provides a basis for 
more extreme or violent actions (Staub, 1990). Those who have failed our moral standards 
are seen as least worthy of moral concern (e.g., criminals; Crimston, Bain, Hornsey, & 
Bastian, 2016; Crimston, Hornsey, Bain, & Bastian, 2018). Thus, acting in ways that give 
greater credence to being labeled immoral (e.g., protestors being violent) is unlikely to 
generate wider support for the urgent changes needed. 
Moral assumptions and “blindspots” 
Some environmentalists may have assumptions about the morality of some behaviours 
that lead them to dismiss effective solutions – moral “blindspots”. An example is having 
fewer children, referred to as “…the great unmentionable of the campaign for more 
environmentally friendly lifestyles” (Williams, 2010, p. R222). Wynes and Nicholas (2017) 
identified that, for an average US citizen, not having a child has an annual impact on 
emissions at least 40 times greater than avoiding a transatlantic flight, not using cars, using 




that this strategy is less morally acceptable than others. In academia, it was claimed to 
overlook proper attention to human rights (Pedersen & Lam, 2018), and claimed that public 
resistance based on conceptions of the good life were justified for “…good reason: high-
impact lifestyle choices require ongoing commitment to forego benefits that society generally 
sees as desirable” (Stern & Wolske, 2017; p. 2, italics added). In the popular press, having 
fewer children to address climate change has been described as “…a socially and morally 
bankrupt argument” (cited in Brown, 2018, August 4), and having children defended as a 
“profoundly human act” (Taylor, 2019, February 27). 
There are legitimate moral considerations for any emissions-reduction strategy policy 
(e.g., implementation through incentives or coercion), but this is less relevant to people’s 
personal decisions. Until personal carbon emissions are drastically reduced, each extra child 
requires food, clothing, shelter, and other resources/activities that increases carbon emissions, 
especially in industrialised countries. A decision to not have a child avoids carbon emissions 
for that child and any descendants, and reducing birth rates could account for 16-29% in 
reductions of global emissions by 2050 (O'Neill et al., 2010), although the extent of this 
reduction is disputed (Bradshaw & Brook, 2014). 
But if the collective norm for environmentalists is to morally defend some high-
emitting activities (e.g., having children), we should not be surprised when people apply 
similar defences to others (e.g., owning a car or flying). As a personal decision, choosing 
whether or not to have a child or a car is influenced by many considerations, of which carbon 
impact can be one (Wynes & Nicholas, 2018), and the choice not to have a child is one some 
people are already making (Hunt, 2019, March 12). If we are asking people to make dramatic 
changes in their personal lives, we should give them the information and agency to make 




This illustrates a broader point that people’s visions of a moral society vary. For 
example, those on the political left (who tend to hold more pro-environmental values; 
Caprara et al., 2017) tend to give more moral consideration to fairness and avoiding harm, 
and less to obeying authority and being loyal to their group than those on the political right 
(Haidt, 2007). Moreover, instantiations of moral principles vary widely across contexts and 
cultures (Shweder, 1994), so the vision of the moral society we want to create through 
addressing climate change should respect and integrate diverse community conceptions of 
morality.  
Addressing these challenges 
How can we address these challenges for creating a more moral and caring society 
through climate change action? Here we offer some (non-exhaustive and non-exclusive) 
suggestions. We acknowledge that these are biased towards democratic contexts, and several 
are already being considered/implemented in some places. 
Engage positively with people unconvinced about climate change 
It may be tempting for advocates to ignore or ostracise those who doubt climate 
change, but moral threat research shows that rejection motivates stronger defensiveness and 
resistance. Instead, emphasise that climate change is a collective failure that all in society 
have contributed to – in religious terms, we are all sinners but we can work towards 
redemption. This can broaden moral standing, reduce accusations of moral hypocrisy and the 
need for moral purity, and would reduce the burden on children to hold society to account. 
Citizens’ assemblies 
Citizen’s assemblies empower a group reflecting a wide cross-section of society to 
learn about social issues to develop broadly acceptable solutions and policies. Collective 
decision making allows new norms to emerge because proposed solutions can come to be 




with people from different backgrounds also helps overcome moral blindspots and provides a 
prosocial outlet for addressing moral threat. The process also demonstrates a shared concern 
and openness to others, modelling a more cohesive and caring community. 
How these assemblies are framed and led is important to their success. For example, 
Extinction Rebellion propose a citizens’ assembly focused on “climate and ecological 
justice” (https://rebellion.earth/the-truth/demands/). While this focus on “justice” appeals to 
the political left, it can alienate the political right (Whitmarsh & Corner, 2017). Ecological 
justice is important, but given the urgent need for widespread support and action, a framing 
emphasising “protecting our communities” may be more effective in engaging both the left 
and right. 
Advisory personal carbon budgets 
An advisory personal carbon budget provides people with agency and choice in how 
they reduce their emissions. It does not substitute for broader regulation and structural 
changes needed to address climate change, but helps those who want to do the right thing 
make reductions and trade-offs consistent with their differing circumstances. Using a budget 
target consistent with their country’s emission commitments, it allows people to calculate the 
emissions of major types of activities (and ideally their lower-carbon alternatives) to assist 
their decision-making. For example, substituting public transport for car travel is easier for 
city-dwellers than country-dwellers, but the latter could use their budget to identify offsets in 
areas less critical to them.  It would focus on assisting major decisions with the greatest 
emissions impacts (e.g., transport and food for Europeans; Dubois et al., 2019), e.g., the 
emissions of buying a new electric vehicle every 5 years for the next decade compared to 
keeping their existing petrol car for that period. It could be adjusted periodically in line with 




This idea overlaps with carbon footprints, but there are differences. First, its focus is 
on informing future decisions, whereas carbon footprints usually focus on quantifying past 
behaviour. This difference opens new options for emissions reductions that can overcome 
blindspots. For example, knowing the carbon emissions of having children is useful for future 
decisions, but not once children exist (common online carbon footprint calculators do not 
include emissions from having children). By expanding the possible areas for emissions 
reductions it partially addresses the issue that what we choose to measure can render other 
things invisible (Paterson & Stripple, 2010). 
This approach also differs from government-enforced personal carbon allowances, 
involving sanctions or trading, which have received varied public support and low political 
support (Corner, 2012, April 30; Jagers, Löfgren, & Stripple, 2010). Exceeding the advisory 
budget is not subject to formal sanctions, nor can unused budget be traded to others. Instead, 
promotion of these budgets would emphasize their role in being a good moral citizen 
contributing to a more moral society, and being under the budget could informally serve as a 
basis for pride or praise, as well as develop broader social norms about acceptable levels of 
emissions.  
Continued commitment to non-violent action 
Both those protesting for change and those in power can reduce the chance of non-
violent protest escalating into more extreme actions and undermining moral bases for change. 
For activists, non-violent approaches are effective (Ackerman & DuVall, 2000), but more 
extensive immoral actions will undermine public support from those wanting a more moral 
society. Authorities can also help reduce the likelihood of escalation through genuine 
engagement, reducing the chance of anger transforming into contempt. One way is to deliver 
on expressed commitments (e.g., meeting/exceeding emissions targets) and implement viable 




citizen assemblies. Invitations for the powerless to develop programs can be a tactic of the 
powerful to stall change by shifting the policy-making burden (King, 2010/1968; pp. 143-
147). Governments should act now where they can, e.g., implementing industrial emissions 
policies. 
Integrate environmental, economic and social outcomes. 
To garner the greatest public support, climate change policies should explicitly 
address social and economic outcomes to deliver valued co-benefits to society. This is a 
central promise, and challenge, of policies such as a “Green New Deal”. For example, in 
transitioning away from coal-based energy or eating meat, there should be economic and 
social initiatives for people in those industries who fear for their livelihoods and 
communities. Addressing climate change can provide opportunities to address longstanding 
social issues such as inequality or poverty (Klein, 2015; Zhenmin & Espinosa, 2019), 
enhancing its moral standing. 
However, there is a psychological “catch”. Our recent work (Bain et al., under review) 
shows that people in both developed and developing countries see a tension between 
environmental and social sustainability – more attention to climate change and other 
environmental issues means less attention to achieving social benefits such as reducing 
inequality or improving education. Overcoming this belief could be a key challenge in 
gaining widespread support for integrative policies – either by convincing people that 
sustainable environmental and social outcomes are not really in tension, or demonstrating 
how these trade-offs can be minimised. 
Are people ready to act? 
Until low/no-emissions technologies are widely available, we need to consume less 
carbon intensive products and activities. This means making reductions in activities many 




may be a major hurdle to action, but some evidence suggests there may be greater support 
than might be assumed. In a US sample, most people supported reducing consumption 
(Markowitz & Bowerman, 2012). Moreover, cross-cultural research in 27 countries across six 
continents has identified that many people had moderate ideals for their lives, e.g., although a 
minority wanted to be completely happy and free, most people’s ideals included sadness and 
restrictions on freedom (Hornsey et al., 2018). This suggests that many people are 
psychologically prepared for living in a world with limits. 
Having moderate material aspirations suggests that people are open to alternative 
conceptions of prosperity or “the good life” that are not centred around material excess. 
Knowing that people are motivated to create a more moral and caring society – one 
conception of the “good life” – is consistent with the type of societal shift some argue is 
necessary to address climate change (Jackson, 2017; Monbiot, 2017). This involves moving 
towards a community-centred society where prosperity is found in relations with others, and 
where status and wellbeing are derived from our skills and efforts to contribute positively to 
those communities. 
Political and economic structures have their own inertia and imperatives that resist 
rapid change, leading to our reservations about whether action will be widespread and quick 
enough to minimise the dangerous outcomes of climate change. However, psychologically at 
least, many people seem prepared to make the adjustments needed to address climate change, 
especially if it contributes to a more moral and caring society. The public may be closer to 
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